DDC
| 519.542 |
Tác giả CN
| Peterson, Martin |
Nhan đề
| Non-Bayesian decision theory : beliefs and desires as reasons for action / Martin Peterson |
Thông tin xuất bản
| Dordrecht : Springer, 2008. |
Mô tả vật lý
| 170 p. ; 24 cm. |
Phụ chú
| Theory and decision library. |
Tóm tắt
| This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. To some extent, the author's non-Bayesian view gives a modern account of what decision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, Savage, and Jeffrey. The author argues that traditional Bayesian decision theory is unavailing from an action-guiding perspective. For the deliberating Bayesian agent, the output of decision theory is not a set of preferences over alternative acts - these preferences are on the contrary used as input to the theory. Instead, the output is a (set of) utility function(s) that can be used for describing the agent as an expected utility maximizer, which are of limited normative relevance. On the non-Bayesian view articulated by the author, utility and probability are defined in terms of preferences over certain outcomes. These utility and probability functions are then used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, which conform to the principle of maximizing expected utility. It is argued that this approach offers more action guidance. |
Từ khóa tự do
| Bayesian statistical decision theory. |
Từ khóa tự do
| Decision making -- Mathematical models. |
Từ khóa tự do
| Utility theory -- Mathematical models. |
Khoa
| Khoa Công nghệ Thông tin |
Địa chỉ
| Thư Viện Đại học Nguyễn Tất Thành |
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082 | |a519.542|bM3825|223 |
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100 | |aPeterson, Martin |
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245 | |aNon-Bayesian decision theory : |bbeliefs and desires as reasons for action / |cMartin Peterson |
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260 | |aDordrecht : |bSpringer, |c2008. |
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300 | |a170 p. ; |c24 cm. |
---|
500 | |aTheory and decision library. |
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520 | |aThis book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. To some extent, the author's non-Bayesian view gives a modern account of what decision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, Savage, and Jeffrey. The author argues that traditional Bayesian decision theory is unavailing from an action-guiding perspective. For the deliberating Bayesian agent, the output of decision theory is not a set of preferences over alternative acts - these preferences are on the contrary used as input to the theory. Instead, the output is a (set of) utility function(s) that can be used for describing the agent as an expected utility maximizer, which are of limited normative relevance. On the non-Bayesian view articulated by the author, utility and probability are defined in terms of preferences over certain outcomes. These utility and probability functions are then used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, which conform to the principle of maximizing expected utility. It is argued that this approach offers more action guidance. |
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541 | |aMua |
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653 | |aBayesian statistical decision theory. |
---|
653 | |aDecision making -- Mathematical models. |
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653 | |aUtility theory -- Mathematical models. |
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690 | |aKhoa Công nghệ Thông tin |
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852 | |aThư Viện Đại học Nguyễn Tất Thành |
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856 | 1|uhttp://elib.ntt.edu.vn/documentdata01/2 tailieuthamkhao/500 khoahoc/anhbiasach/33280_non bayesian decision theorythumbimage.jpg |
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